[Public-List] Seamanship and command

Fri Feb 14 08:13:58 PST 2014

Good morning John,

You've described an interesting situation.  On one hand, the skipper was
clearly grappling with a serious problem if he felt his crew were losing
control of their fear.

I wasn't there, but in '06 was in a race aboard SURPRISE where a very bad
thunderstorm blew through and actually sank one of our fleet.  We had seen
the squall coming and were snugged down comfortably (heeling with the port
rail in the water although we had no sail up at all).  Part of our emergency
routine was to have our VHF manned.  My son Peter was reported distress
calls coming in steadily.  I could tell this was not contributing to our
sense of well-being.

Before we went out I told my crew that the forecast included the possibility
of a squall, and I described what I'd be looking for as signs of the
approach of one.  

When we one was developing, I narrated what was happening, defusing fear by
making a lesson of the experience.  I told them that there was going to be a
lot of noise and wind, we wouldn't be able to see, but also that these
things happen and we've been through them before.  I reminded individuals of
what their assigned duties were and what they'd have to be ready to do.

One of the people in the boat that day has never sailed again.  So I guess I
wasn't completely successful in displaying competence... But we came through
it without any particular stress to SURPRISE (so I reckoned).

Getting back to what you asked me, I think in principal it's not good to
hide from facts...  I might suggest that the skipper in that situation might
have done better to explain everything he was doing about the situation, and
carrying his crew with him dealing with it.  By turning off the radio he was
hiding a problem and in principal there's nothing good about that.  I'd
suggest it's better that everyone face reality and thereby be able to do
their best to cope.

But, I wasn't there....

Gord

On 14/02/14 11:01 AM, "John Birch" <Sunstone at cogeco.ca> wrote:

> This is a very interesting thread you have started.
> 
> What are your thoughts about the 79 Fastnet, and the decision by a leading
> name in racing, to order the radio turned off as it was rapidly undermining
> his crew's morale (fighting panic that was developing aboard) in a survival
> storm in which they could do nothing to assist?
> 
> They survived, along with their vessel, and being ahead of most of the
> fleet, were unable to go to weather in such conditions anyway.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> John
> 
> 
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Gordon Laco" <mainstay at csolve.net>
> To: "Alberg 30 Public List -- open to all" <public-list at lists.alberg30.org>
> Sent: Friday, February 14, 2014 10:37 AM
> Subject: [Public-List] Seamanship and command
> 
> 
> Good morning friends,
> 
> I¹m finally getting on top of the material that accumulated in my office
> while I was away in San Diego attending the International conference on Sail
> Training.  One of the topics I participated in had to do with the issue of
> how decisions are made both under routine and high stress situations in
> sailing vessels  I was impressed by the openness and candid sharing of both
> success and other stories among the delegates.  I contributed my own, and
> reckoned that as a group, we Alberg 30 sailors might find benefit too.
> 
> In the RCN as well as other navies, and merchant services too, officers are
> trained to use of the principals and code of logical thinking grouped under
> the title ³Bridge Resource Management².  Boiled down and over simplified,
> basically this title describes a quite complex system of thinking in which
> chain of command in a vessel is maintained, but at the same time is open to
> input from below on the food chain of rank.   When Bridge Resource
> Management is in effect, it means that the collective intelligence and
> experience of all members of the bridge team in a ship is being utilized,
> rather than just the commander¹s.
> 
> In a yacht, it means that while the owner is usually the skipper, a culture
> would exist on board where he/she is receptive to advice or cautions from
> the crew.  Sounds simple but it isn¹t because the person in command must on
> one hand maintain command and control, while on the other hand, he/she
> likely has more experience than the crew who might be offering cautions or
> advice.
> 
> This is a very interesting subject.
> 
> Overlaying the effectiveness of a particular vessel¹s Ocollective
> intelligence¹, is the issue of experience with relation to judgment.
> People with less experience can be more easily pushed into assuming a crisis
> on board than others with more experience....but there¹s a trap here.  More
> experience can mean what our navy (and yours in the States too most likely)
> ³habituation to danger².  What that means is an officer (or skipper) might
> be taking note of rising winds and sea state and say to him/her self ³I¹ve
> seen it like this before, this isn¹t so bad².  Each time an otherwise
> stressful condition is dealt with, the pain threshold for recognizing the
> particular condition as crisis is pushed further along.   One can still
> understand professionally and intellectually that bad things can still
> happen, but an internal confidence develops that emotionally can lead one to
> believe that one will always make it back, regardless of the challenges.
> This can be called overconfidence.  A representative of a military service
> at the conference commented that helicopter pilots are known to be prone to
> this after 1200 to 1400 hours of experience.  They can be more dangerous
> than when they were inexperienced because they have become Ohabituated or
> desensitized to danger².
> 
> In a yacht, exercising bridge resource management and being aware of
> habituation can be a big issue.   I think we¹ve all had crew members new to
> sailing who are alarmed at what we consider moderate angles of heel or spray
> coming over the boat.  A big part of good seamanship is being open to
> protests or comments from the whole range of categories of crew (experienced
> to neophyte) while keeping them effective and remaining aware of the reality
> of situations.
> 
> The punch line to this long discussion (I¹ve only given a glimpse of what
> was discussed) is that a little bit of ³fear² on the part of the person in
> charge on board is a very good thing.  One must never forget how quickly
> things can go wrong...and how the ³cascade of decisions² toward a disaster
> always, always starts long before one knows one is in trouble.
> 
> Bridge Resource Management can be effectively instituted even in a yacht.
> One method that is very easy to implement is the assignment of
> responsibility to regular crew members either in a family situation about to
> go for a sail, or a racing crew about to set out on a Wednesday night.  I¹m
> going to do this aboard SURPRISE.  My son Peter, will be responsible for
> rigging and sails,  Steve will be responsible for SURPRISE¹s safety
> equipment (life jackets, lifelines, fire ext etc) Clint will be responsible
> for the engine and it¹s systems.  I¹ll be responsible for the weather
> forecast and general oversight.
> 
> Before departing, we¹ll take a moment in the cockpit and I¹ll say Ohi guys,
> what¹s the situation?²  Each person has a chance to speak.  They reply with
> any of the following responses.... ³One!² if all is well in their
> department.  ³Two, and....²  this means it¹s good but there¹s an issue.
> ³Three, and....²  means no good, and here¹s what¹s wrong.  As skipper, I
> moderate the discussion of the issues, and two things result.  First,
> everyone isn¹t depending on just me to cover everything.  Second, everyone
> is aware of everything that could easily be things only I am aware of.  The
> collective intelligence of the whole crew is applied to what we¹re about to
> do and nobody is alone trying to do everything.  This only takes a few
> minutes to do, but I think you¹ll see represents a completely different
> situation on board with regard to attitude.   Nobody is blindly following,
> it¹s much more difficult for a potential safety problem to be missed (or
> hidden).  Everyone feels they are contributing to the safe and seamanlike
> handling of the yacht....  It¹s safer, more professional and also, quite
> simply more interesting.
> 
> That¹s good seamanship.
> 
> Interesting, isn¹t it?
> 
> Gord Laco #426 Surprise
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